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
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
 
  
 
Abstract 
In this work we analyze the issue of taxation in an intertemporal economy 
with endogenous fertility under critical-level utilitarianism, both from a 
positive and normative standpoint. On the positive side we analyse the 
effects of a change in the tax on capital income and on the population size, 
both separately and in a policy aiming at maintaining per-capita debt 
constant. On the normative side, we characterize the first-best and second-
best optimal tax structures both when labour supply is exogenous and 
endogenous. 
Keywords: Taxation, endogenous fertility, critical level utilitarianism, 
population. 
J.E.L. Classification: D63, H21, J13, O40. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The issue of optimal taxation is a long-debated subject in economics. However, only 
recently the consequences of endogenous fertility have been explored. In fact, traditionally 
the two topics have been analysed separately: on the one hand, the problem of optimal 
taxation in dynamic general equilibrium models has been investigated extensively: see 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) for the earliest results on finite-time economies; Judd (1989) 
and Chamley (1986) for the results in infinite horizon economies based on Ramsey (1928); 
Erosa and Gervais (2002) and De Bonis and Spataro (2010) for overlapping-generations 
economies; and Basu, Marsiliani, and Renström (2004) and Basu and Renström (2007) for 
indivisible labour economies. 
On the other hand, another strand of literature has been focusing on the optimal 
population growth rate (Samuelson 1975, Deardorff 1976 and, more recently, Jaeger and 
Kuhle 2009 and Renström and Spataro 2010) and on the role of endogenous fertility on 
optimal welfare state design (in particular social security, see, for example, Cigno and 
Rosati 1992, Zhang and Nishimura 1992 and 1993, Cremer, Gahvari and Pestieau 2006, 
Yew and Zhang 2009, Meier and Wrede 2010). 
In this paper we aim at addressing the issue of optimal taxation in presence of 
endogenous fertility in a unified framework. In particular, we tackle such an issue by 
assuming that agents are entitled with “critical-level utilitarian preferences” (see Blackorby 
et al. 1995)
1
. Critical-level utilitarianism is an axiomatically founded population principle 
that can avoid the repugnant conclusion (see Parfit 1976, 1984, Blackorby et al. 1995 and 
2002). The latter implies that any state in which each member of the population enjoys a 
life above “neutrality” is declared inferior to a state in which each member of a larger 
population lives a life with lower utility. Indeed, such a result is likely to emerge in 
economic models under classical utilitarianism (CU) and endogenous fertility, that is in 
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 Among other non utilitarian principles, seem, for example, Golosov, Jones and Tertilt (2007). 
 2 
presence of social orderings based on the (sum of) well-being (i.e. utilities) of the 
individuals who are alive in different states of the world. 
Indeed, there are several ways for avoiding the repugnant conclusion. Some earlier 
literature assumed objective functions of a particular form.
2
 However, such objective 
functions may not have an axiomatic foundation. We believe an axiomatic foundation is 
important, especially because we are dealing with questions regarding life (who will live 
and who will not)
3
. In fact, in a twin paper (Renström and Spataro 2010) we have shown 
that critical level utilitarianism (CLU) can deliver a steady state equilibrium entailing an 
interior solution for the rate of growth of population, provided that the critical level belongs 
to a positive, open interval. We recall here that the critical level α can be defined as the 
utility level of an extra-individual i who, if added to an unaffected population N with utility 
distribution u, would make the two alternatives socially indifferent, i.e. (N,u) as good as 
(N,u;i,α).  
In the present work we rely on the work by Blackorby et al. (1997) allowing for the 
possibility of discounting the utilities of future generations. However, we depart from the 
existing literature in that we tackle the issue of taxation, both from a positive and normative 
standpoint, in a general equilibrium setting, with endogenous population and CLU. To the 
best of our knowledge, this has not been done before
4
. 
The paper is organized as follows: after presenting the model, in section 3 we 
characterise the steady state equilibrium and, in section 4 we perform a comparative statics 
analysis in order to assess the effect of taxes on the equilibrium levels of consumption and 
population growth rate. Finally, in section 5 we characterize the optimal structure of taxes 
both in absence and in presence of endogenous labour supply.  
 
 
2. The economy 
 
We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that each generation lives for one period, and 
life-time utility is u(ct), where ct is life-time consumption for that individual. This means 
that generations will not overlap
5
. We also follow the convention that u = 0 represents 
neutrality at individual level (i.e. if u < 0 the individual prefers not to have been born), and 
denote the critical level as α. We start our analysis by assuming that labour supply, l, is 
exogenously fixed and normalized to 1; we will relax this assumption in section 5.2. An 
individual family chooses consumption, savings and the number of children (i.e. the change 
in the cohort size N). As for firms, we assume perfectly competitive markets and constant 
return to scale technology. The consequence of the assumptions on the production side is 
that we retain the “standard” second-best framework, in the sense that there are no profits 
and the competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient in absence of taxation. Otherwise there 
would be corrective elements of taxation. Finally, we assume the government finances an 
exogenous stream of expenditure by issuing debt and levying taxes. 
To retain the second-best, we levy taxes on the choices made by the families, i.e. 
savings and population. Consequently we introduce the capital-income tax and a population 
tax proportional to the number of children. Furthermore, we allow the government to levy a 
tax on the choice each generation makes about the size of the next generation. Regarding 
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 E.g. Barro and Becker (1988) and Becker and Barro (1989). 
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 A similar problem of optimal fertility has been dealt with by Barro and Becker (1988) and Becker and Barro 
(1989), although they do not deal either with critical level utilitarianism or with taxation. 
5
 This assumption can be relaxed without changing the fundamental properties of the model. 
 3 
the population tax, it does not matter if we tax the present generation or the future, because 
of altruism. For simplicity we assume that the children pay the population tax, making it 
proportional to N and when parents make choice of number of children they take into 
account this tax liability and resulting reduction in their children‟s consumption. 
Consequently the population tax distorts population choice.  
 
 
2.1. Individuals 
 
The problem of each household is to maximize the following birth-date dependent 
critical level utilitarian objective function: 
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where u(ct) is the instantaneous utility function, increasing and concave in ct, ρ > 0 is the 
intergenerational discount rate and α > 0 is the critical level. Since we fix neutrality 
consumption to zero (i.e. u(0)=0), this implies that c
α
, satisfying u( c
α
 )=α, is strictly 
positive. Moreover, At is household wealth,  kttt rr  1  is net of tax interest rate, and kt  
and Nt  are the tax rate on capital income and on the population (household) size, 
respectively. 
The population size, Nt, grows at rate nt, i.e. 
 
t
t
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We assume that there are lower and upper bounds on the population growth rate: 
 nnnt , . Realistically, there is a physical constraint at each period of time on how many 
children a parent can have. There is also a constraint on how low the population growth can 
be. First, we do not allow individuals to be eliminated from the population (in that there is 
no axiomatic foundation for that). Moreover, even if nobody wants to reproduce there will 
always be accidental births. Clearly, from eq. (1) the problem has a finite solution only if 
n  which we assume throughout our analysis. 
 
2.2. Firms 
 
Assuming constant-returns-to-scale production technology,  tt LKF , , zero capital 
depreciation rate and perfect competition, firms hire capital, K, and labour services, L, 
(where t t t tL l N N  )  on the spot market and remunerate them according to their marginal 
productivity, such that 
 
tK t
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Moreover, the economy resource constraint is: 
 
 ,t t t t t t tK F K L c N g N   .        (5) 
 
 
2.3. The government 
 
 
We allow government to finance an exogenous stream of public expenditure by issuing 
taxes, both on capital income and population size, and debt, B, whose low of motion is the 
following: 
 
k N
t t t t t t t t tB r B r A N N g     .        (6) 
  
We take g as exogenous (rather than G=gN), preserving second-best analysis as N 
grows. This is a natural assumption when population size is endogenous.  
We should note a potential externality problem. If the government is fixing a stream of 
per capita public spending, the total expenditure will be proportional to the population size. 
When individual families decide on family sizes, they will not take into account the 
externality on the government‟s spending side. Consequently, a system of lump-sum 
taxation (lump-sum per family) will not implement the first-best (as mentioned before, 
however, in absence of government spending and taxation, the competitive equilibrium is 
Pareto-efficient). 
 
 
2.4. Per-capita formulation 
 
In some instances, it will be convenient to use per-capita notation. We then define the 
capital intensity 
K
k
N
 , such that, by exploiting constant returns to scale in the production 
function we can write:  ( , )F K L Nf k , kkfkfLKFL )()(),(  . Hence, the capital 
and debt accumulation constraints in per capita terms can be written as: 
 
 t t t t t tk f k c n k g              (5‟) 
 
  k Nt t t t t t tb r n b ra g      ,        (6‟) 
 
where ta  is per-capita individual assets (At/Nt).  
 
 
3. Decentralized solution 
 
The problem of the individual (household) is to maximize (1) subject to (2) and 
 nnnt , , taking A0 and N0 as given. The current value Hamiltonian is: 
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The first order conditions are the following
6
:  
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and the transversality conditions are 
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We now characterize the competitive equilibrium. Supposing that the economy starts at 
time t=0, we recall that a competitive equilibrium is time paths of: a) policies 
      
.
0,,

 tBtt Nk  , b) allocations       
0
, ,c t N t K t

 , c) prices 
    
.
0
,w t r t

 , such that, at each point in time t: b) satisfy max eq. (1) subject to eqs. 
(2) and (3), given a) and c); c) satisfies eqs. (4a), (4b) and eqs. (5‟) and (6‟) are satisfied. 
Moreover, under a competitive equilibrium, the Walras law holds, such that the following 
condition applies: 
 
ttt bka  .          (8) 
 
We first examine the nature of the population choice, n. Since λ (the co-state for N) is 
the shadow value of population size, from equation (7d) we can see that if λ is different 
from zero, either population should be increased as much as possible (λ>0), or as little as 
possible (λ<0).  
In fact, by integrating (7c) we get: 
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The integrand is the difference between two terms. One term, ( ) ' Lu c u F  , is the 
value (in utility units) a new individual brings to the family (his/her utility in excess of the 
critical level α plus the utility value of his/her labour endowment), and the other is the 
value (in utility units) of what the new individual is taking out of the family (consumption 
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plus the population tax). If these terms are the same for the entire future, then population 
size is optimal, and λ is zero.  However, we have shown in another work that, without 
taxes, along the dynamic path, population will grow either at the maximum or at the 
minimum speed, the interior solution arising only at the steady state (see Renström and 
Spataro 2010). We will briefly discuss the dynamic properties of the model in the next 
section. 
 
  
3.1. Steady state 
 
If the steady state solution for n is interior, then  =0 and by exploiting eqs. (4a)-(6) 
and (7a)-(7e) we can provide the following three equations which fully characterize the 
steady state: 
 
    ksskf 1)(          (10a) 
 
ssssssss cgknkf )(          (10b) 
 
])()([
)(
)(
:0 ssssssNss
ss
ss
kkfkfc
cu
cu



 

.     (10c) 
 
Moreover, it can be shown that the interior solution for n is granted by the critical level 
belonging to an open, positive interval (for details see Renström and Spataro 2010):  
 
 ,   ,           (11) 
 
where 
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 and   gknFFc ssssKssN   and   gknFFc ssssKssN  . 
 
In fact, when 0  (i.e. Classical Utilitarianism case) or  0 , then the solution 
for the population growth rate will be nnss  , that is the repugnant conclusion would arise, 
in that the population should grow at the maximum speed; on the other hand, if    then 
the solution would be the opposite, nnss  , that is the population growth rate should be at 
its minimum, which resembles the solution obtained in the Average Utilitarianism case.  
We will assume that α is in the interval given by (11), such that the solution entails an 
interior value for n. If this were not the case, our model would resemble a Cass-Koopmans-
Ramsey model with exogenous fertility, which has been already deeply studied. 
In Figure 1 we depict the three loci described by eqs. (10a)-(10c) where the steady state 
equilibrium is represented by point E. Equation (10c) gives all combinations of per-capita 
steady state consumption and per-capita capital that constitute an optimal population size. 
As anticipated above, this is the case when what an individual brings to the family (utility 
above α plus the labour endowment) is equal to what he/she takes out (consumption plus 
the population tax). These combinations are depicted by the 0  locus in Figure 1. For 
trajectories inside the 0   locus,   is negative and consequently n is at its lower corner 
 7 
n . For trajectories outside the 0   locus,   is positive and n is at its higher corner n . 
The steady state value of per-capita capital is given by  ( ) 1ss kf k   , giving the 
vertical 0c   line. The steady state population growth rate is such that 0k   line cuts in 
point E. We should notice that the trajectories leading to E are not the usual saddle-paths. 
The reason is that we are in a corner with respect to n along the transition. For capital 
stocks lower than k
ss
 it is optimal to pick an unstable trajectory in a system where n n ) 
and when reaching E, switching from n  to n
ss
. Similarly, for capital stocks greater than k
ss
 
it is optimal to take an unstable trajectory in a system when n n  and when reaching E, let 
n jump from n  to n
ss
. Point E is also reached in finite time.
7
 
We will show in section 5 that under the optimal tax programme (in the first or the 
second-best) that the steady state per capita assets, a
ss
, are positive. Consequently, the 
steady state consumption level is greater than the one giving critical-level utility, i.e. c
ss
 > 
c
α
. To show the latter it is sufficient to see that, by substituting eqs. (4a) and (10a) into the 
steady state equation for the household budget constraint (eq. 2), expressed in per-capita 
terms, the RHS of eq. (10c) is equal to (ρ-nss)ass > 0, where the inequality follows from 
ssnn   and, hence, by eq. (10c) we have u(css) > α. 
 
Figure 1: The steady state equilibrium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Positive analysis of taxation 
 
In the section we aim at analysing the effects of taxation on the equilibrium of our 
economy. We will perform some comparative statistics exercises in which we either let one 
tax change, keeping the other constant while adjusting public debt, or let both taxes change 
simultaneously so as to keep the steady state per capita public debt level the same. 
Since in the normative analysis in section 5 individual assets are shown to be positive, 
we will confine our positive analysis to the cases in which such a feature holds. 
As for the effects of a change of the tax on the family size, the results are summarized 
by the following Proposition: 
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Proposition 1: At the steady state, an increase of the tax on the family size increases 
consumption, decreases the rate of growth of population and leaves capital intensity 
unchanged. 
 
Proof: Since eq. (10a) provides the solution for  ss ss kk k   which, under concavity of 
the production function, implies 
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By substituting such a solution into (10b) and (10c) we obtain the expressions for the 
solutions of n and c as functions of the taxes: 
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Hence, by totally differentiating eqs. (10b‟) and (10c‟) with respect to N  we get that at the 
steady state 
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Since at the steady state u , the Proposition is proved.  ■   
 
Figure 2: The effects of an increase of the tax on the population size 
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Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 2. When the population tax is increased (keeping 
the capital-income tax constant), the 0   locus shifts outwards (i.e. the region for which 
tn n , is expanded). As a consequence the new steady state is where the 0c   line cuts the 
new 0  locus, at E‟, and the new steady state growth rate for population is lower 
than previously ( 0k   shifts upwards). The new steady state level of consumption is 
higher, while the capital intensity is unaffected. If this policy comes as a surprise tax 
change for the individual family, per-capita consumption jumps from E to E‟, and the 
population growth rate falls to the new level immediately. Consequently there is no 
transition dynamics in this case. 
 
As for the effects of a change of the capital income tax we can provide the following 
Proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: At the steady state, an increase of the capital income tax increases 
consumption and decreases both the rate of growth of population and capital intensity. 
 
Proof: By differentiating eqs. (10b‟) and (10c‟) with respect to k  we get:  
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Figure 3: The effects of an increase of the capital income tax 
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Figure 3 illustrates the result summarized in Proposition 2. Note that, in this case, when 
the capital income tax increases, the 0c   shifts to the left and the 0k   moves up, while 
the 0   does not change, such that the new steady state equilibrium moves from point E 
to point E‟. The latter entails a higher consumption level and both lower population growth 
rate and lower capital intensity. 
If this tax change comes as a surprise, per capita consumption jumps onto the new 
trajectory leading to E‟. This implies that per-capita consumption first jumps to a high 
level, and then gradually falls to its new level, creating a consumption boom. During the 
transition, the economy is outside the 0   locus and consequently population growth is 
at its maximum, n . When reaching the new steady state in finite time population growth 
falls to its lower new steady state value. Thus, the economy experiences a population 
growth burst (“baby boom”) and then a fall in the population growth rate. 
 
As a general comment on the analysis carried out so far, we can say that the long-run 
effects on the economy of an increase of either taxes are very similar, in that both reduce 
the population growth and increase consumption. However, the increase of the capital 
income tax creates temporary population and consumption bursts and reduces the steady 
state capital stock, while an increase in the population tax does not. 
 
Finally, we analyze the case in which the government changes both taxes in such a way 
that per capita debt remains constant. Since the changes in the capital and the population 
taxes have the same qualitative effects, if we were to increase one of them and decrease the 
other so as to keep the debt level constant, we may ask which tax dominates. 
Preliminarily, we provide a sufficient condition according to which any such policy 
implies that taxes move in opposite directions (e.g. an increase of the capital income tax 
with constant per capita debt implies a reduction of the tax on population size).  
 
Lemma 1: At the steady state, an increase (decrease) of capital income tax aiming at 
maintaining per-capita debt constant, implies a reduction (increase) of the tax on the 
population size if the capital income tax is lower than a threshold, i.e.: 
 
0
k
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

 if kk   , where   




 

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'
1
'
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k
b
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f
kfk  and 
 

uu
u
k
b
M
''
'2
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Proof: By exploiting eqs. (8) and (10a), the steady state government budget constraint can 
be written as:  
 
    gfknb N   ' ; 
 
totally differentiating the above expression with respect to k  yields: 
 
1 1
' ''
N
k k k
dn d dk
f f k
d b d b d


  
     . Recalling that 
N
k N k k
dn n d n
d d

   
 
 
 
, and 
exploiting eqs. (13a) and (14b) we get also:  
 
 
 
 
 
2 2
' '' '1 1
'
'' ''
N
k k k
u f k udn d dk
f n
d k u u d k u u d

    
 
    
   
.      (15) 
Hence, by equating the two above expressions for 
k
dn
d
 and collecting terms it follows that: 
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where 
 

uu
u
k
b
M
''
'2
. Let us assume that  M1  is positive (by continuity, at least 
around b=0 this condition is satisfied). Since 
k
dk
d
< 0, it follows that 
0
N
k k
k
d
d

 

   .      ■ 
 
k  in Lemma 1 is the steady-state Laffer maximum capital-tax rate. For any initial 
capital tax rate lower than this level, when the government is increasing the capital tax rate, 
it can lower the population tax rate and keep the debt level the same. If the initial capital 
tax rate is higher than the Laffer maximum, then an increase in the rate makes the 
government to lose revenue, and to maintain the same level of debt, it would have to 
increase the population tax rate. In fact, in the latter case, there is room for decreasing both 
taxes. We will assume that the initial capital tax rate is lower than the Laffer maximum, i.e. 
that kk   8. 
 
We now focus on the sign of the derivatives of both c and n, which, a priori and 
differently from the effect on the capital intensity, are ambiguous. Our findings are 
summarized by the following Proposition 3:  
 
Proposition 3: At the steady state, a tax reform consisting in an increase (decrease) of the 
capital income tax and a reduction (increase) of the tax on the population size in such a 
way to leave per-capita debt unchanged, implies that both capital intensity and the 
population growth rate decrease (increase) and per capita consumption increases 
(decreases). 
 
Proof: By plugging eq. (16) into eq. (15) and collecting terms it descends that 
 
  0'
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1
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
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
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
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kk d
dk
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


.      (17a) 
 
Moreover, by differentiating (10c) with respect to k  we get that 
 
 ' 0k k k
dc dk dn
f n
d d d  
     and, more precisely, 
 
  0''
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



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

kk d
dk
f
k
b
nf
M
M
b
k
d
dc



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 Incidentally, note that when b=0, the condition above boils down to 
''
'
k f k
f
    (and the latter inequality is 
both necessary and sufficient for 0
N
k
d
d


 ). 
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 In Figure 4 we illustrate the above Proposition. The increase in the capital income-tax 
makes the 0c   line shift to the left, and the reduction in the population tax makes the 
0  locus move left (shrinking the region for which n is at its lowest corner, n ). The new 
steady state is at point E‟, associated with a lower population growth rate (since the 0k   
line shifts upwards), higher per-capita consumption, and lower capital intensity. For a 
surprise tax reform of this kind (keeping the new steady state government debt level the 
same), per-capita consumption first jumps to the new trajectory, and then gradually falls 
toward its new steady state level. Since the economy is outside the 0   locus during the 
transition, the population growth rate is at its maximum. When the economy reaches steady 
state in finite time, the population growth rate falls to its new lower value. The dynamic 
path is qualitatively the same as in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 4: The effects of constant per-capita debt redistribution of taxes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The latter tax reform showed that the effect through the capital income tax dominates. 
 
 
5. The Ramsey problem 
 
We now solve the optimal tax problem (Ramsey problem). We shall first find the first-
best solution, and then move on to the second-best. Since the first-best is obtained as a 
solution to the second-best problem, when the second-best constraints do not bind, we 
formulate the latter problem from the outset. In doing so, we adopt the primal approach, 
consisting of the maximization of a direct social welfare function through the choice of 
quantities (i.e. allocations; see Atkinson and Stiglitz 1972)
9
. For this purpose it is necessary 
to restrict the set of allocations among which the government can choose to those that can 
be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium. We first find the constraints that must be 
imposed on the government‟s problem in order to comply with this requirement. 
In our framework there are two implementability constraints, one associated with the 
individual family‟s intertemporal consumption choice and one associated with the fertility 
choice. 
                                                 
9
  On the contrary, the dual approach takes prices and tax rates as control variables. For a survey see 
Renström (1999). 
O 
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 =0  
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α 
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0c  
  0ssnk  
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The first constraint is the individual budget constraint with prices substituted for by using 
the consumption Euler equation (the formal derivation is provided in Appendix A.1): 
 
  dtNcwueuA tNttttt   

 ''
0
00        (18a) 
 
The second one is given by the following: 
 
*
, 0
, 0
, 0
t t
n
n n
n





 
 
          (18b) 
 
where   is according to (9), and *tn  is any level of n. 
Finally there are the feasibility constraints, one which requires that private and public 
consumption plus investment be equal to aggregate output (eq. 5); the other is given by eq. 
(3). 
 
 
5.1. Solution 
 
In this section we characterize the solution to the Ramsey problem. As already 
mentioned, the policymaker has to abide both the implementability and the feasibility 
constraints in order to insure that the optimal allocation, solution of the Ramsey problem, 
implements a competitive equilibrium. 
Hence, supposing that the policy is introduced in period 0, the problem of the 
policymaker to maximize (1) subject to eq. (18a), and, 0t  , eqs. (5), (3) and (18b). 
Note that the latter constraint (18a), involving   (eq. 9), entails both an integral and an 
inequality, which is difficult to be dealt with. However, as already mentioned, for 
trajectories inside (outside) the  =0 locus, the expression in square brackets in equation 
(9) must be negative (positive) at each instant t (for details see Renstrom and Spataro 
2010). We associate this latter inequality with the multiplier  . Hence, the current value 
Hamiltonian is: 
 
       
  ttttttttt
N
ttLttttt
N
ttLtttt
NnNgNcF
cFucuNNcFucuNH
tt



 )()( ''
  (19) 
 
First order conditions for this problem are the following (we omit the time subscript 
when it does not cause ambiguity to the reader and the transversality conditions for the sake 
of brevity): 
 
      

 N
L cFuu
c
H
''1'0      (19a) 
 
    


LKK FuF
K
H
'       (19b) 
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          NFugcFcFuun
N
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LLL
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L  


''  
(19c) 
0





N
n
H
           (19d) 
 
where in eq. (19c) we omit the term  )(' NL cFuu    because this condition, 
being a Kuhn Tucker complementary slackness condition, must be identically equal to 
zero. Recall that , being the shadow price of capital, is strictly positive and  , being a 
measure of the deadweight loss stemming from distortionary taxation, is zero at the first-
best and positive at the second-best. 
 
Moreover, equating eqs. (7a) and eq. (19b) to zero, yields: 
 
 



K
LKk
F
Fu'
 .           (20) 
 
In light of the results above, we can now characterize the first-best policy. 
 
Proposition 4: The first-best policy implies that capital income tax be zero, the tax on the 
family size be equal to the per-capita public expenditure and the public debt be equal to 
zero. 
 
Proof: At the first-best the government controls c, n, k, directly. Consequently A and   are 
not binding, which implies that 0   . By (19a), (19b) and (7a), (7b), at each instant t 
'q u    and 0k . Moreover, since the first-best    (i.e. the government evaluation 
of the population is equal to the households‟ evaluation), from (7c) and (19c) it follows that 
N g  . Finally, since q  (the marginal value of capital is equal to marginal value of 
private assets), it descends that, at each instant t, a=k and b=0.    ■ 
 
A comment on the latter result is worth making. The reason why the population tax 
implements the first-best rather than a family-level lump-sum tax, is because the externality 
a family has on the government budget when choosing the number of children is perfectly 
internalised when N g  .  If there is any public debt it should be defaulted upon, otherwise 
the population tax would have to exceed the public expenditure level, and the first best 
would not be implemented. 
 
Suppose now that the first-best taxation is not implementable; more precisely, we 
assume that the constraint gNN  max  is binding which happens if 
  0' 


Nu
H
N


,          (21) 
which means that the Hamiltonian is increasing in the population tax as long as the 
second-best constraint binds. 
In this situation, only a second-best allocation is implementable, with the level of 
capital income tax given by (20). Hence, we can summarise our finding as follows: 
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Proposition 5: The second-best tax structure implies gNN  max  and positive capital 
income 
 
0
'






K
LKk
F
Fu
. Moreover, the optimal level of debt is negative. 
 
Proof: The levels of taxes, N  and k , descend by construction and by eq. (20) 
respectively. Hence we focus on the sign and the level of optimal debt.  By (5) and (19b) 
we get  
  
 
   

 'KNuFNgcfK
dt
Kd
LK  
 
and eqs. (3) and (19c) yield: 
 
 
     2' 'NL LL LL N
d N
N u c N u N F c F N u F N F c g
dt

                  ,  
 
such that, by exploiting CRS, whereby NFKF LLLK   
 
     NL cFNuNuNK
dt
Nd
dt
Kd


 ')()( . 
 
Finally, by integrating both sides it follows that: 
 
       0 0
0 0 0 0
0
'
T T T T
T
T t t t N
t t t t t t t t N
t
e N K N K e N u u F c dt
 
      
               . 
 
Taking the limit for T  and indicating t1 as the instant in which the steady state is 
reached (recall that this economy reaches the steady state in finite time), whereby both   
and   are equal to zero, exploiting transverality conditions we end up with the following 
expression: 
 
     

 
1
1
11
'1
t
N
Ntt
tt dtFcNueK 

.  
 
Next, by eq (18a) the integral at the RHS of the equation above is equal to 
11
'
' tt Au , which 
yields 
 
  1 1
1 1
1
'
t t
t t
K
u A

  . 
 
Note that the equation above states that, at the steady state of the second-best, private 
assets are strictly positive. By plugging the expression above for 
1t
  into (19a) (for any 
generic instant 1tt  ), substituting from (20) for     and exploiting (8), the following 
equality holds: 
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Finally, recalling that at the steady state equilibrium    ancF NL   , we get 
 
  0
'
'' 
uF
F
knu
a
b
LK
K
k
 .     ■   
 
A final comment on the results is worth making. The nonzero capital income tax is 
non-standard in the traditional literature on optimal taxation and exogenous population 
growth, in that, typically, in the long run the second-best result entails zero tax on capital 
income, stemming from the optimality of uniform commodity taxation (Atkinson and 
Stiglitz 1972), although some exceptions may arise
10
. The rationale of our result is the 
following: when labour supply is exogenous there are labour rents present. If those rents 
are not taxed at 100%, the standard second-best results will not hold, in particular results on 
uniform commodity taxation. In fact, a capital tax partially taxes those rents (because 
LKF >0). 
As for the negative level of debt in the steady state, under the second-best it is optimal 
to run primary surpluses at the beginning of the tax programme, arriving at the steady state 
with public assets. At the steady state, tax receipts fall below the level of public 
expenditure, though not being zero (i.e. it is still optimal to carry tax burden to the steady 
state). 
 
5.2. Endogenous labour supply 
 
We now show the solution to the Ramsey problem when individuals can endogenously 
offer their labour services and (distortionary) taxes on wages are levied. The instantaneous 
utility function is now of the form  tt lcu , , assumed to be decreasing in labour supply tl  
and is strictly concave. Total labour supply is then Ntlt = Lt. The household budget 
constraint is now 
 
t
N
ttttttttt NNcNlwArA 
.
       (2‟) 
 
where  lww  1  is the wage rate net of labour income tax l , and the first order 
conditions of the individual problem entail now the following condition: 
 
qwu
l
H
l 


0 ,                  (7a_bis) 
 
which, combined with eq. (7a) provides the following: 
 
 w
u
u
c
l  .                   (7a_ter) 
 
                                                 
10
 For example, in OLG economies (as argued by Erosa and Gervais 2002) or in presence of different 
discounting between government and individuals (see De Bonis and Spataro 2005) or a combination of two 
(see Spataro and De Bonis 2008). 
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Moreover, recall that the decentralized equilibrium implies that the gross wage rate be 
equal to the marginal productivity of labour, that is 
 
tL t
F w            (4b‟) 
 
All this said, the problem of the policymaker becomes: 
 
  dtlcueN
t
tt
t
t


 
0
,max   
 
subject to 
 
   dtNculueuA tNtctlt tt 
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00 ' , 
 
and eqs. (5), (3) and (18b), where   is given by the following expression: 
 
    
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Again, it can be shown that, for trajectories inside (outside) the  =0 locus, the 
expression in brackets in the integral above must be negative (positive) in each instant t. 
Hence, by making use of eqs. (7a) and (7a_ter), the current value Hamiltonian function is: 
 
        
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N
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N
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     (22) 
 
Then, FOCs now imply: 
 
 0 1c c
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c
   

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where 
 Ncc lc
c
c
u c u l
u
 
   and 
 Ncl ll
l
l
u c u l
u
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   are usually referred to as the 
“general equilibrium elasticity” of consumption and leisure, respectively. By dividing eq. 
(22b) by (22a) we obtain: 
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1
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c c
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u
  
  
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, and, using eq. (7a_ter) yields: 
 
  
 1
l cl
c
 

  
  

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.        (23) 
 
As for capital income tax, since at the steady state the LHS of (22a) is constant, then the 
RHS is constant as well, such that, by eq. (22c) it turns out that k =0. Finally, as for N , 
we can start by observing that the tax structure 0k  0l , gN   and b=0 would 
implement the first-best allocation. Hence, in order to get a second-best allocation, we 
again impose that the constraint gNN  max  is binding, which is insured by the 
condition (21), assumed to hold.  
Hence, we can provide the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 6: At the steady state the second-best tax structure implies that capital income 
tax be zero, the tax on the family size be equal to the maximum positive level max
N  and 
labour income tax be nonzero. Sufficient condition for the latter tax to be positive is that 
leisure is non-inferior. 
 
Proof: Since the other results are clear-cut, here we provide the proof for the labour income 
tax. Recall that  
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Preliminarily, if leisure is non-inferior, then 0
Nd
dl

. By differentiating per-capita budget 
constraint with respect to N , exploiting eqs. (7a) and (7a_bis) one gets: 
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Moreover, by eq. (2‟), expressed in per capita terms, at the steady state we get that: 
 Nc wl n a     . Hence, eq. (24) can be written as: 
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2
cc cl l l l
l c ll lc cc cl
c l l c c c
u u u u ul
n a u u u u
u u u u u u

    
             
     
  (24‟) 
 
Since, by following the same steps as those made in the Proof of Proposition 5 it is possible 
to show that individual assets are positive (the complete proof is available from request to 
the authors) and given that at the steady state n  >0, it follows that the first term on the 
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RHS of eq. (24) is non-negative. As for the second term of the RHS, the term in square 
brackets is a quadratic form in the Hessian to u(c,l). Since u is concave, the Hessian is 
negative definite and the quadratic from is negative. Consequently the last term: 
 
1
1
ll cll
l
cl ccl c
c
u uul
u
u uu u
u
 
               
 
 
is positive (given that 
l
l
u
<0) and 0l c   .   ■  
As a final comment, we conclude that with endogenous labour supply, there are no labour 
rents, and with (yet distortionary) labour income taxation, the zero capital income tax result 
is restored (i.e. the optimality of uniform commodity taxation). Also, the labour income tax 
is positive (at least if leisure is non-inferior) implying that it is optimal to carry tax burden 
to the steady state.
11
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In the present work we tackle the issue of taxation in presence of endogenous fertility 
and under critical level utilitarian preferences. From a positive standpoint we show that a 
rise of the tax on the family size decreases the population growth rate and increases steady 
state per capita consumption, and does not affect capital; on the other hand, a rise of the 
capital income tax reduces both steady state capital and population growth rate, and 
increases per capita consumption. However, the increase of the capital income tax creates 
temporary population and consumption bursts and reduces the steady state capital stock, 
while an increase in the population tax does not. 
We have also analysed the effects of a fiscal policy aiming at redistributing the tax 
burden in such a way to maintain per capita debt unchanged. The latter tax reform implies 
that capital and the population growth rate move in the same direction as the change in the 
tax on population size, while consumption follows the direction of change of the tax on 
capital income. Surprisingly enough, on policy grounds the latter result suggests that an 
economy that wishes to increase population growth but is burdened by high public debt 
(such as Italy) could increase the tax on the family size and reduce capital income taxes 
correspondently, such that, in the long run, both the rate of growth of population and the 
capital intensity would be increased, though with the consequence of experiencing a 
reduction in the long run per capita consumption and a temporary reduction of the same 
population rate of growth.  
As far as the normative analysis is concerned, we show that, at the steady state the 
first-best policy entails zero capital income tax and zero debt and positive taxation of the 
family size, no matter whether labour supply is endogenous or not. However, when only a 
second-best tax structure can be implemented, then nonzero tax in capital income and 
negative debt turn out to be optimal in case labour supply is exogenously fixed. Finally, the 
zero capital income tax result arises also in our model when labour supply is endogenous 
                                                 
11
 In our endogenous population economy, non-inferiority of leisure is sufficient for the labour tax to be 
strictly positive at the steady state. On this issue in a Chamley setting, with fixed population, see Renström 
(1999). For indivisible labour economies, with fixed population, normality is needed for a positive labour tax, 
see Basu and Renström (2007). 
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and taxes on labour income can be levied. The latter turn out to be positive if leisure is a 
non-inferior good. 
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Appendix 
 
In this Appendix we show that any allocation stemming from a competitive equilibrium 
satisfies implementability and feasibility constraints (18a) and (5). 
By multiplying both sides of eq. (2) by 
 
t
dssr
t eq
0 , integrating out the household‟s budget 
constraint and exploiting the transversality condition we get: 
 
   
 0 0
t t
r s ds r s ds
N
t t t t t t t t tA r A q e q N e w c 
  
    , that is 
  dtNcwueuA tNttttt   

 ''
0
00 . 
As for feasibility, write eq. 2) as  1 k Nt t t t t t t t tA r A w N c N N      . Using market 
clearing condition (eq. 8) we get: 
 
  1 k Nt t t t t t t t t t tK B r K B w N c N N        ; 
 
 moreover, by exploiting RCS and using eqs. (4a) and (4b) we get: 
 
 N kt t t t t t t t t t t tK F B r B c N N r K B        ; 
 
 and, finally, by exploiting debt equation (eq. 6) it descends that 
 
t t t t tK F c N g N   . 
